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
The Journal of Psychohistory

Global Wars to Restore Masculinity

The U.S. Frontier Myth

American Militarism

2010: Year of the Bully

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CHRISTIAN LACKNER

Europe: Hierarchical Super State or Participatory Network?

PREFACE

After I gave the article below to the 2010 International Psychohistorical Association Convention, I was asked to add a Preface to it because it might seem to be idealizing the European Union too much and Journal readers in the U.S. might not understand it because the recent financial crisis in the European Union could require strong transnational measures to be put into action to save the Union and its common currency. I feel urged to comment this request by pointing out the following.

In all of my recently published articles about the relation between hierarchies and networks[1] I have always pointed out clearly the vulnerability of networks as they are by law superficial and little reliable, because they function only as long, as their members draw out advantages. But when the ability rises to overcome this weakness, they represent a much higher capacity in resolving complex modern challenges than hierarchies can, for system-immanent reasons. And it is true that within the E.U., countries like Greece and all others fully took advantage of this circumstance, delivering false information about their actual financial situation, this way getting around meeting the agreed upon harsh criteria of deficit spending. These practices were well known by the ECB[2], the E.U.-Commission and the E.U.-parliament, but when they would have given more time, I do claim, these problems would have been resolved in a less cruel way we are seeing now. But Europe is not alone and by far not autonomous in our global world, the pace is determined by the fast. What is likely based on cooperation and coordination of diverging interests within the E.U.— what takes time—faces another mode more dominant outside the E.U.: an ongoing, increasingly economic war between nations and continents.

In psychohistory we speak of psychogenic evolution when new childrearing modes find their way into a society, bringing out a new psychoclass, having been raised in a more loving way and therefore acting less bellicose, resolving conflicts in a more advanced and mannered way through negotiations and compromises. How does this fit into the language we read daily in the newspapers and comments about the E.U. being "under fire", "hunted to death by a horde of wolves", where the "weak will have to be separated from the strong"? Who in this game is more advanced: the ones with the (money) weapon or the ones sitting on the table of negotiations?

One does not have to be a Marxist or anti-capitalist to find it astonishing how a bunch of CEOs from investment companies get together for dinner in New York where they decide to put the Euro under pressure by taking their money out of Europe, then betting on the state loans of the weakest like Greece to make huge gains on the falling value of nations, taking into account riots, violence and even a civil war. Is it not astonishing to see the presidents of European nations sitting together all night waiting in freighting for the Tokyo stock market to open, so they can see how their decisions are being accepted by a stock market? Aren't we psychohistorians barking up the wrong tree when analyzing the behavior of nations to understand the evolution of societies when they only exist at the mercy of global financial warlords? Nations like the U.S. might have the nuclear power to destroy the world a thousand times; the financial warlords have the power to destroy the world with money worth more than a thousand times the real values. Thus the vicious mix of free money grabbing on the playground of politics, because hard ware economics are not a gain any more, makes keynote players on the economy side more involved into society-relevant questions. But they are by far not as "visible" as the nations-leaders, they seem invisible and therefore stimulate the fantasy of their being gods more effectively. When the surplus on money swings up to a sacrifice, it will pull its "partners" with them, and the signs on the stock markets will—as already shown—being degraded to react of what hidden tycoons say, not to politics anymore, the U.S. always having been double headed in this respect: overcontrolling with a "regulation-anger" in the private sector and at the same time hating the official controlling state. There is a strong difference between hierarchy and authoritarian behavior and to my experiences, Europeans have strict national hierarchies and less authoritarian behavior whereas in the U.S. we find the contrary: sloppy structures carried by a common moral private code. The advantage of the U.S.-way is that its citizens are forced to act; Europeans tend to delegate their personal fate in the hands of institutions.

Also, within the E.U. some nations prefer to see the market being the main driving force, saying the state should take care the market can rely on a functioning infrastructure and not interfere further. Others see the political work as the main power, where the will of all finds the good. Mainly economic networks like the E.U. might be too weak to fight well organized financial warlords. The crisis also brings out an acceleration of an evolution that would have had to take place anyway: Europe is growing together politically and will turn out in a less superficial, but more hierarchical way, having to control what members are doing and how they misuse the freedom they have had. Maybe Europe is not yet ready for too much freedom, but others still seem to be having an eye on it, the financial economy being by far transnational, but not enough in responsibility of public needs—besides—*Panem et Circenses*.

EUROPE AS A NETWORK

European philosophers of the post war period pointed the way ahead when sensing that the changes of societies were speeding up in a magnitude producing challenges in the creation of new identities leading to the disintegration of Western populations. Peter Heintel founded the Association for the Deceleration of Time in Austria 20 years ago and sees the main problem in the rapid loss of traditional social patterns[3] that now will have to be substituted by organizational efforts wherein a state, worn out by economic pressure, reaches its limits. Especially in times of rapid changes, more time is needed to analyze and recapture the situation frequently. We just saw the world running against the wall by merely not listening to what these philosophers have been predicting for decades. The old pattern seemed to have won, a revival of Manchesterism with the power of immense virtual finance, punishing its own greed.

The critique of the philosophers were never pointed against a technological progress, although it has muted to a new religion with the believing a technical world could resolve emotional problems. It did not, but it created some more. But this is not the issue here. The discussion was focusing on the way societies are constructing themselves, mainly dominated by hierarchies since the beginning of civilization—and since then a source of conflicts by creating a relation between powerful and slaves, reversible by principle, as known from revolutions. Hierarchy has no natural enemy, it is genuine men-made, concluding that a transformation will have to be made willingly, out of pure difficulty and despair—then

creating problems of lost identities, ultimately asking external enemies to help out. This explanation is widely accepted by progressive parties in Europe, demanding equalization shifting the view to what has been excluded so far, e.g. the capability to extinguish mankind, fast in a global nuclear war or slow, by increasing the collective metabolism through the irrevocable exploitation of natural resources. It is not a miracle but also a shift in the building of human made communicational structures that can lead to the ability of managing complex problems, though, as said, in disadvantage against speed and ongoing organized devastation.

I will try in the following to show with a simple model, how hierarchies work and what comes after when these principles are being disturbed, then trying to find a relation between old and new Europe and the shift of organizational patterns due to the impossibility to overpower another. In respect of communication structures, hierarchies have to seen as the most powerful and progressive communicational network in history, and, of course as well as the system that used up the most energy of nature and human lives. The core model is based on a triangular relationship between individuals, one representing a superior being, the other two being inferior and devoted to fulfill orders.


For hierarchies to function properly it is necessary for the system to limit communication between the subjugated, only allowing a top-down, bottom-up communication where the top does the thinking (monopoly of wisdom), the deciding (monopoly of power) and sanctioning (monopoly of force), and the bottom is considered to execute whatever the top commands. No cooperation between the inferiors is necessary, if not ordered by the superior, not thinking and no decision making other than following the orders correctly. This way a high degree of division of labor can be achieved, giving the superior time to develop his/her capacity to increase knowledge and power. Early philosophers in our an-

cient hierarchies soon found out about the weaknesses of this principles, such as Plato, who pictured the contradiction in the Socratic dialogue *Thrasymachos*[4] dealing with the question of the righteousness between superiors and subjugates, pointing out the mutual dependencies. Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic[5] describes the same, adding the immanent reversibility of the relationship between master and slave and the permanent energy consuming process to keep up the top-down relationship in order to prevent rebellions. Hierarchies permanently have to violate the need of inferiors to communicate with others and create mistrust between them (divide *et impera*!) as only at the highest level the Free are allowed to discuss common matters. We all know how creative hierarchies can be in keeping this latent dissatisfaction low. The old Greek invented Olympic games, the Roman Empire is not thinkable without their production of 'Panem et Circenses', and modern societies do the same with sport events and other spectaculars (TV, mass events, etc.)—all to keep the 'slaves' (we now call them employees; the Italian language revealing more their origin by calling them 'Dependente' from thinking too much and following what is being ordered from the top. Most people in the highly developed countries live a life of a modern slave. The privilege of minimizing heteronomy is given few but keeps growing, confronting more and more with the 'curse of freedom'—taking over responsibility.

The emotional side of hierarchical relationships is relatively simple but at the same time very effective: As long as you are a good slave/boy/girl and do what is being told, we will reward you, but when you stop fulfilling our needs, our anger will harm you severely and you will be punished. Seen from a communicational point of view it is crucial for superiors to prevent and undermine communication between inferiors. This has to be considered a felony against the system itself because it might result in actions against the top-down/bottom-up ultimately leading to revolutions (Hegel's reversibility). We can observe this principle in all strict hierarchical systems such as dictatorships or authoritarian systems; therefore hierarchies create secret services, spy systems, observations of the public, etc., to keep the formal top-down/bottom-up mode in function. We know from history that these measures have to be considered the beginning of the end. Smart hierarchies, such as the Roman Empire, survived for a longer period, because they practiced the principle of subsidiary, avoiding hierarchical behavior, even allowing the conquered regions to keep their own law but offering them to use the Roman jurisdiction if they liked. The end of this policy also marked the end of this Empire.

A slight change in the relationship pattern of three units being involved creates a great difference in the dynamic of the system. Once the relationship-triangle is being enhanced, the inferiors creating relationships with each other as well, things become much more complicated.

The pattern of communication reaches an over proportional higher level of complexity. Not only are there three instead of two communication lines now, it is not simply an addition, but the whole dynamic of the group of three changes dramatically. It seems merely impossible that the three relations reach the same quality, as this is a process of mutual dependency, the relations and less the individual players influencing each other—the function of the group has now to be described as the *relation of the relations*. One might think of a simple example: a couple loving each other invites a friend over for dinner who is the working mate of the male part. During the evening the female part of the couple gets to know the partner's friend and starts creating sympathies for each other. At once it is clear that this would affect the couple's relationship. The emotional characteristic of the triangle turns out to be *jealousy*, forcing the supposedly lucky situation into a 2:1 solution, leaving all in a stage of likely mutual mistrust being turned down by the other. The early and basic model for this phenomenon is the triangle between the parents and the child, the mother-child relationship leaving the father at least partially excluded in the early period.

To handle this immensely increased complexity of the relationship of relations without falling back into pairs and singles requires a high amount of social skill of all involved, retaining the minimum of mutual trust in a situation where actually nobody can trust the other. To socially survive in such a climate one needs to be tough. Social competence and self-confidence on the other hand is a result of how I was treated as a child, being able to have confidence to my parents although they keep me out of their

bedroom—they will treat me lovingly and not abandon me. I do assert that on the capability of individuals being able to handle triangular situations one can measure their maturity in handling complex social challenges.

Structurally both, hierarchical patterns of communication and more group-like patterns have to be considered networks, merely differing by the level of complexity that has to be handled.

HIERARCHY CRISIS

Modern hierarchies become more and more complex social architectures that combine formal and informal network-like structures—often for a limited period—with the traditional top-down difference in influence and responsibility. The reasons for these developments are:

- The system-immanent problem of hierarchies to exclude issues/questions/problems they are originally not made for (e.g. ecological/social aspects of profit oriented organizations) leads to frictions within the system when the pressure of the Excluded increases.
- Once hierarchies open up for primarily excluded issues, the complexity of tasks increases dramatically, then impossible for traditional hierarchical structures to handle properly. Project-like ways of communication and small groups (teams) have to come in and, only by being put into existence, increase the complexity even more as they function in a different logic, contradicting hierarchies per se.
- Along with the increased complexity of tasks to integrate what has formerly been excluded comes the fact that single hierarchical decisions by leaders turn out to be completely insufficient, their modern task is not only to make decisions but to create communicational structures are capable to find the best decisions (reverse of competence).
- Hierarchical information-flow top-down and especially bottom-up turns out to create falsehoods due to the "how do I tell it to my boss" effect. Any problematic issue (e.g. deriving from having to deal with the excluded which cannot be ignored anymore) that is being addressed to a superior has the tendency to play things down as giving bad news to the boss might result in the fate of Hiob. This way, problems at the bottom dissolve once having reached the top of the hierarchy—top management often sees only sunny weather in times of severe turbulences.
- Hierarchy functions along the principle that the top is in charge of the thinking, while the bottom is operating. This circumstance

tempts dependents to quit thinking and become increasingly ignorant. Hierarchy therefore creates 'stupid' people, delegating problems bottom-up where is not enough competence for resolving problems in a way that corresponds with the complexity of the matter. Strict hierarchical behavior produces children, which were adults beforehand. At last no one takes over responsibility, the bottom because they only wait for orders and the top because they do not decide, their intellectuality being demanded too much.

- Hierarchies do create a high effort only to secure their existence, ultimately only being busy with themselves and forgetting what their original task is about. They tend to restage old patterns, creating a distance towards reality, externally as well as internally. Things are being done because they have always been done so. As the problems with this behavior increases, the resistance against reflection of the system itself increases as well. Hierarchies therefore do not reflect on themselves, creating a resistance towards learning and progress.
- In tendency hierarchies ignore the needs of their members. This is one reason for the existence of unions. One does not feel emotionally attached to systems, hierarchies, to organizations generally. We love their power but we hate their ignorance of our individuality. This results in a lack of motivation of members ultimately leading to the habit to work to rule, while 'life' is happening outside of hierarchies in leisure times, where self-discipline is being thrown aboard. The emotional profit out of hierarchies seems to be marginal as it is considered to provide life but not being part of it.
- This makes hierarchies vulnerable to corruption we see all over the world. Permanently published corruption indices show that there seems to be a correlation between the degree of the rigidness of stately hierarchies and corruption. The figures shown in these indices have to be considered as not very accurate as it is a distinguished fact that corruption takes place secretly. In most cases we can view corruption as a hidden collaboration between official hierarchies and money-networks buying advantages. They relate to each other like sisters and nurture fantasies of conspiracy.

Despite the numerous critical aspects of hierarchy we seriously have to consider, as mentioned earlier, that

1. There *is* no other system capable of organizing and providing a large number of people with decisions.
2. The most efficient system mankind has created so far are hierarchies

based on laws made by representatives of the people, which guarantee a sufficient amount on justice and transparency.
3. Networks cannot be thought without being in some way attached to hierarchies, either as existing preliminary to hierarchies, besides (supporting) hierarchies or being against (contrasting) hierarchies.[6]
4. Any idea of a hierarchy-free society has to be called an illusion deriving from the reaction we call 'counter against organizations' as a system of anonymous communication.[7]
5. Any network-, or project-like structure being implemented into hierarchies to enhance their capability in handling complexity cannot be seen as a simple additional process but furthermore embedding a contradiction within the system that in order to be managed sufficiently requiring a profound qualification in conflict management.

In the following I will try to apply the above structural considerations on the experiment of creating a European Union, now consisting of 27 nations, each of them carrying a historical load of harsh hierarchical governments, presently uniting in what seems to be more then just a trading organization, but less than the reproduction of a state-like transnational empire.

HOW HIERARCHICAL IS THE EUROPEAN UNION?

In his recent book,[8] one of the guiding intellectual forces, Jeremy Riffkin, starts out with the thesis that the great contradiction in the history of mankind lies in the price for our increasing empathic self that leads to a growing exploitation of our planet and that network-like structures exceed already aggressive hierarchies in their capability to accelerate entropy and violence against nature and ultimately against mankind. He states though that advanced network-like structures—although highly aggressive—could bring the key to turnaround, focusing their power to save mankind from self-destruction by using their capacity of empathy not only for human beings but also for nature. This is in short Riffkin's main thesis, which he then elaborates thoroughly.

Can an analysis of the difference of communicational structures between hierarchies and networks support Riffkin's thesis, or should we have to consider further categories of human development to underline his picture of future development?

For centuries the relations between European nations was characterized by mutual hostility, insufficient national institutions and wars after periods of great progress and innovations. The 'never again' promise after WWII must not only rely simply on a moral appeal but had to have con-

sequences on a structural level. Out of despair, Germany, France and Italy were the first in 1957[9] to create a manifest for a federalist Europe which was being followed by the ECC (European Economic Community), regulating the steel and oil based industry in a way of forced cooperation, mainly with the intend to prevent these nations to again start a war as its products are crucial for armies and arms. The rest is known, leading to today's European Union of the 27, a common currency, several reforms, the last one written down in the Lisbon-Contract and an open future with many question marks.

Complaints that the E.U. was weak and slow in finding common decisions—a cowardly wimp—can be heard mainly from the outside,[10] but also every once in a while within Europe. In a certain sense this is true. Almost every common decision has to undergo laborious procedures, the consensual principle requiring convincing every member-state to agree, as in many questions a simple voting to gain a majority is not enough. This lengthens decision-making considerably. But there is—at least in the present status—no other choice. No nation has been forced to become a member, on the contrary nations stand in line applying to be part of the E.U.. The participatory approach attracts many as the chance is given to influence the forth going of the E.U. in a voluntary manner. This is the glue keeping the E.U. together. It is the perspective that the benefits for each nation are higher than the sacrifices due to sticking to the common rules, which are being created by all.

CERTAINLY THE E.U.-EXPERIMENT FACES ENORMOUS PROBLEMS

It cannot be repeated often enough: what we see in the Europe of the past 60 years is quite unique in the history of western civilizations. Peoples and nations having been massacring each other for thousands of years now have started to become a union, based on peace and cooperation. Obviously this could not have been a mere stroll. Overcoming such historical differences and hatreds now may and already do result in a gathering of knowledge helping all to find solutions for problems that were unable to handle as a single state beforehand. No wonder, the U.S. does not have a great interest in seeing a potential competitor arise, although first wanted to make business with, the global shift of power, bringing in the Asian countries first and now the rest of the world, relativists a blunt struggle for hegemonies.

Always when there has to be achieved a common solution on basic questions differences and contradictions between the members come out

more clearly, as happened in the recent years when trying to find a ratification of the Lisbon-Treaty by the national governments. Ireland, having profited highly in the past years from the E.U., due to the opening of the labor market and a national flat tax model, has seen the end of the flourishing period and fell into the hands of right wing demagogues, blocking the treaty with a referendum for more than a year. Almost all new members from the former Warsaw Pact opposed the treaty for several reasons. Poland showed a historical motivated opposition reflex against Germany, while the Czech Waszlaw Klaus made himself representative of the voices that want to see Europe as a hotchpotch of nations opening their borders only for free trade, but not as a community with a political center. The reliable opposition reflex of the former eastern nations when it comes to tendencies of centralization is easily explained by the circumstance having been subjugated one time by the West, the other by the East. People being suppressed continuously create an amazing ability to get around anything coming from an authority. This also explains the great affinity of these countries for the U.S., which in their eyes still stands for freedom and wealth, the basis of their activities being the E.U. however.

As in so many regions in this world, differences in Europe are to be located along the geographical lines east west and north south. The southern members of the E.U., due to a weaker economy, receiving development status from the beginning on; a highly delicate political challenge as no one wants to be "helped" by means of being told by others how to improve. Southern nations can look back to a harmful history regarding being dominated by more powerful northern nations in Europe. Traditional diplomatic measures have become untrustworthy, the E.U. had to find new ways of helping its members by giving help so the countries can help themselves without loosing sovereignty and self respect.

The Balkan countries must be seen as a special case. Psychohistorical Studies in the past[11] have showed some causes for the difficult development of this region and until today the Balkan rips a hole into the territorial integrity of the E.U.. While Slovenia has become a member very quickly after the Balkan War and soon met the criteria to become a EURO-country, others need more time and it is by far not only measured by economic power, but also by knowledge gained that cooperation is only possible by achieving compromises rather than by violence.

Still we see a high potential of aggressive behavior among applying states, no wonder after centuries of violent history. A European diplomat expressed it this way: "the paradox of the Balkan lies in the circumstance that after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia being held together by

the Tito regime, each ethnicity claimed their own state without any institutional infrastructure. Now we have to help to build autonomous states to later bring them back together within the E.U..["12]

The persistency of the past can also be seen in the not ending flood of mutual prejudice. Some countries (not only the boulevard press there) seem to leave out no occasion to bring back the German Nazi picture, something that seems difficult to let go off, although reality by far is a different one nowadays. With irony the Scandinavian countries look down south, commenting the revival of the Austrian monarchy, Vienna once again being in the center of economic development measures in the new eastern member states Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, etc. Germans are being seen as orderly and accurate, Italians as chaotic and noisy, the Spanish as Machos, the French as notoriously eating too much and nationalistic, etc. etc. the list could be extended endlessly, helping to keep up identities which tend to diminish in a continuing melting process.

NO CLEAR IDENTITY . . . WHAT IS EUROPE?

Sometimes it seems that Europe's identity is clearer seen from the outside than within the E.U.. The U.S. might see it as a new player in global power games, others might see it as the innovation center of China, others again as the place where milk and honey flows. Practically from the beginning of the E.U. the discussion has not come to an end, what Europe actually is, where it begins, where it ends, what it looks like, and so on. Not even the definition of the continental borders as such are left out of the discussions.

The E.U. has *no government* but an administrative center with a weak parliament whose power increased though after the last reform. The main concern of each member state, deriving from historic experiences is not to be dominated by other members. Therefore most decisions have to be made consensual, naturally resulting in long discussions and little scope becoming more and more difficult with an increasing number of players. Numerous committees and procedures were put into place to expel injustice and cheat. With the complexity of the various procedures also the obscurity increases, again leading to suspicions of lacking transparency: a vicious circle. The positive effect of the suspicious looking at each other seems to be that the smartest heads of the member countries gather in Brussels and Strasbourg, far away from the political pressures of their countries of origin—an advantage one must not underestimate, as E.U. representatives can even out national particularities, just as in small

groups individual peculiarities are being relativized by the group. How important it is for Europeans that the group of nations makes the important decisions and a central figure must not be too powerful can be seen in the recent creation of the position of a President of the E.U., a representative of all provided with little *pouvoir*.

No European Finance ministry exists, but a European Central bank watching over the common currency, the EURO. It is not necessary as most public spending is still done by the member states themselves. The E.U. collects membership fees, which then are being used to support poorer states and various project. This does not need a powerful finance minister as in the national governments, where this function is the second important to the Prime Minister. Although the E.U. funds are quite impressive, they are mainly used to help the members fulfilling the standards and developments needs primarily agreed upon.

No European Military Force, instead a cooperation of Forces designed in a more police stile mode. The threat of being attacked by the military force of another nation is not considered very probable. European armies are being redesigned after the period of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. Traditional military is useless fighting terrorism. Investigation, small flexible units and prevention measures are rather needed. The other field of deployment develops towards the prevention of the outbreak of violence in other parts of the world, again affording a change in paradigm of military actions. Spending for traditional armies in Europe has decreased dramatically. All in all the power of the military has gone down, but one should not believe that the military is out of business and influence.

No final territorial borders—the E.U. is a concept, not a state. Every member state of the E.U. faces the national problem of on the one side profiting from the community and on the other side every poll shows that the popularity of the E.U. ekes out a wrenched existence. No promotional effort whatever seems to have any effect in creating somewhat like an emotional attachment with the E.U.. It is merely lacking all ingredients that has had blessed nations in the past with euphoric idealization as still appearing in transnational sport events although by far the players resemble a mix of nations.[13] There is not one language, no leader, no real enemy, borders that change every other year, etc.; a flag, a common currency and a treaty is all it has to offer. This makes the E.U. emotionally appear like a 'cold fish;' although it brings wealth, security and growth at the end. Who is likely to become a member has to fulfill a catalogue of criteria not only in economically dimensions but as well in political and

social matters. Down-to-earth a bunch of nations come close to become members such as some North-African countries, Israel as well as Turkey and—why not—Russia. French Prime Minister Sarkozy bravely opened the discussion in public causing a roar of resistance, but actually he is right. Quite some phenomena circle around the divergence between reality and emotional identification such as the fact that regarding on who has influence on local real politics it is mainly the E.U. and the regions holding the steering wheel, the contribution of national government steadily in decrease of their influence, but when it comes to emotional identity, they are the champions.

POSSIBLE SETBACKS AND BACKLASHES

The past decades have shown numerous critical situations for the E.U., each one bearing enough explosive power to end the ongoing experiment. The unification of Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Balkan Crisis, the tricky solidarity with the USA after 9/11, the global collapse of the financial system after the subprime disaster in the U.S., the struggle for a European Constitution, only to name a few, of which the E.U. got out strengthened and richer on experience—so far. Some obstacles are obviously well known; some will probably arise in the future we cannot even think about yet. In the following I will name some (without claim of completeness), first internally, then externally induced problems.

Internally:

Nationalisms and cultural diversity

The lack of nation-like identification models (see above) brings a deficit of emotional attachment with the E.U., offering right wing parties all over Europe a perfect projection platform to gain votes in picturing the E.U. as the enemy of the ordinary citizen. It is the old pattern of the devouring bad self,[14] projected onto an outer enemy. In Austria we estimate the percentage of the population (older psychoclass) susceptible to such popular argument to a steady 20%, depending on the region. The resentment behavior is being nurtured by a continuing migration pressure from African and Asian regions, mostly low educated people with traumatized backgrounds creating great difficulties and efforts in trying to manage a profound integration. Uproars in Italy, France and Germany and less but also in other countries are accompanied by heavy emotions eventually leading to violence as we have seen on several occasions. In a certain way this can be addressed as a dilemma situation as on the on side Europe is facing a permanent and irreversible decrease of population due to a dramatic de-

crease on newborns, desperately searching for trainees in a highly developed society, and on the other side limiting the immigration from the outside, because of political pressure and the fact that many immigrants build ethnic ghettos, mostly resistant to integration efforts. Sealing off the E.U., as proposed by influential leaders such as the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi might turn out to be a crucial backlash in Europe's perspectives in being able to handle a highly diverse population.

Structural deficits (communication and decision-making architecture)

Worn out by diverse national interests, the recently-approved Lisbon Treaty brings a reform of the communication and decision-making architecture within the E.U. administration. In short the parliament is being strengthened, putting more control on the central executive organ, the European Commission, regulating the proportional system of representation in the Commission and the Council and creating the new position of a European President. The overdue reform was mainly made necessary due to the growing number of members, the several committees reaching a size of impracticability. With eventually new members in line such as Croatia and Serbia, this problem will stay as a permanent question of manageability by retaining the principle of consensus in all major questions. The alternative is, as already mentioned, to build a hierarchical government, like a state, which nobody would agree to. As in all organizations the delegation of power is the most crucial question in building societies and is always accompanied by a loss of self-determination. In my view not loosing the basis will be the greatest challenge for the further development of a federal E.U.. With increasing size this will cause major obstacles in creating a communication architecture the world has not seen yet, drive by the despair to keep together a cooperation of autonomous nations by their own will without force. Maybe we will see more of small expert groups preparing solutions with maybe executive power for just a particular problem, retreating right after work done to give place to the next expert group, the power shifting in the executive committees while in steady hands of a parliament with the main function to control the process of balance between the powerful and the ones being effected by their decision, in the end: the people. Just as functioning networks, this would require highly skilled professionals and emotionally resilient participants.

Abstractness and incomprehensiveness

The fact alone that every state has to run agencies helping European public or private organizations to apply for one of the numerous E.U. funds

because an ordinary human being is not capable to understand the procedure shows, that the E.U. administration has constructed a bureaucracy that loses touch with the real world. When the interests of 27 countries and hordes of lobbyists come together in one center it is understandable that nobody understands at the end why things are running in this or another direction. Absurdities created this way are not countable anymore and leave the ordinary citizen with a feeling of complete madness of the system. The complexity reaches a degree one must get the impression of complete lack of coordination. As any other administrational organization responsibilities are divided into sections, separating what in real life belongs together. This can best be seen in cross-issues such as ecology that affect any issue but are being handled separately. Water, waste, energy, traffic, air pollution, trading, hunting, agriculture, etc. are treated in different departments, the nature though is just one. Organizational sciences such as Group Dynamics and Organizational Development have long understood this problem and demand the creation of intermediate organizational units but this goes against the logic of administrational hierarchies, a problem we can see everywhere.

Externally:
Being washed away by the quick-missing opportunities
Due to the lack of consequent hierarchical construction and the principle of consensus the way the E.U. acts and develops is slow. Growth rates and development speed in other parts of the world are of many times in numbers—in developing towards the E.U.-model. Already we see an irreversible process of the industrial production being transferred to China and India, with South America and Africa to come soon. Already the lack of substitute of these work places leads to a high number of workless and open questions what Europe's role in the global economy will be like. Ironically some leaders in commerce and industry say they will all become advisers that soon afterwards nobody would need anymore. Others cling to the idea to keep innovating even harder and so stay fractionally ahead knowing that this as well is a matter of time before the end. Not yet can we see a turn around or a shift of paradigm, e.g. taking advantage of the opportunity to create alternatives like a sustainable life style, although we have been the ones starting the most exploiting way of living the world has seen so far. Strategies of how the species if human beings can survive without destroying the planet are urgently needed, goods as culture, arts and models of social participation and sustainability yet not being valued high enough. Public growth and progress will have to be delinked from the gross domestic product and defined in a multi-criteria way taking into account values that are not so easily measured with figures but with qualities.

Protectionism
Development aid of western countries for the so called Third World has until now to be called half-hearted as customs barriers and subsidies for domestic products have prevented poorer regions in the world from reaching autonomy. One must not be surprised when floods of immigrants are risking their lives to reach Europe where they hope to find a decent living. This post-colonialist style of treating Third World countries, viewing them as deliverer of raw material seem to have reached its limits. China, hungry for the precious soils of Africa already practices another model, not only exploiting but also bringing investments and labor to these regions, finding their difficulties in getting along with the cultural character of the locals. The worst scenario would be Europe ending up with uncontrollable immigration and at the same time being excluded from raw material delivery. In a globalizing world there is no way out for the rich to become poorer and the poor to become richer, if severe conflicts should be avoided. Sending troops to Somalia or other countries which are desperate because their basis of living had been destroyed or exploited by the western world seems like wanting to extinguish a fire being beforehand inflamed by the same people making fishermen to warriors because there are no more fish. The leap to modernity is by any means characterized by growth conflicts, protectionism of the West makes this even worse and will ultimately harm the West itself. The so far successful administrational network of the E.U. might then, seen from the outside, appear as an authoritarian club of snobbish countries defending what they have achieved also by exploiting others with violence against the approach to participate in what has originally been contributed by all.

Reaching limits of expansion
The strict criteria for becoming a E.U. member will prevent for quite some time an all-too-quick expansion of the E.U.. But what we can see already is the copying of the E.U. model in other parts of the world, maybe, in the far future, leading to another network of supersized E.U.-like entities. The manageability of transnational cooperation such as the E.U. has 'natural' limits related to the consensus-based model. Hierarchies theoretically can expand unlimited in putting new entities of responsibility or hierarchical levels that are based on the top-down/bottom-up principle. When all

members have to be involved in the decision-making, a limit is given by the size of the small discussion group that can reach a consensus. Everything else is pure pseudo-democracy, producing winners and losers, either via physical violence or the democratic violence by voting. But maybe we will see more Europe-like constructions ahead, being more capable to manage the world in a network of hierarchies.

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ENDNOTES

1. Christian Lackner, "Emotional Consequnces of Network Structures." *The Journal of Psychohistory* 34(2006): 129-143.
2. European Central Bank
3. Peter Heintel, *Zeitpresse* 1/10, p. 12.
4. Platon, *Politea*
5. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes.*
6. See also Christian Lackner, *The Journal of Psychohistory* 34, Fall 2006
7. *Ibid.*
8. *The Empathic Civilization, 2009*
9. Altiero Spinelli, *Manifesto Dei Federalisti Europei*, 2006
10. We remember the period after 9/11, when U.S. diplomats were searching for partners going to war against Afghanistan and Iraq.
11. Alenka Puhar, "Childhood Nightmares and Dreams of Revenge," *Journal of Psychohistory* 22(2), Fall 1994.
12. Erhard Busek, 2007, Klagenfurt University Speech.
13. For example the Bavarians are more than proud of their first class soccer team although only one or two Germans are members of the team.
14. See the numerous works of Lloyd deMause such as *The Emotional Life of Nations,* Karnac 2002