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

The Journal of Psychohistory

Intimate Life and Social Change

Psychopathology of Terrorism

Emotional Consequences of Networks

Bush's Second Term

The Psychohistory of Learning Disabilities

The Contemporary American Right

The Journal of Psychohistory

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CHRISTIAN LACKNER

Emotional Consequences of Network Structures in Context of Centralistic Systems

I see three things in modern Vienna: It is young, fast and female.
—Lloyd deMause during his visit in October 2005

He also said that Austrians and Germans had improved their child-rearing so much they would not want to go to war any more, and therefore they will have to find other ways of handling their growth panic—handle conflicts non-violently and even experiencing slower growth and more unemployment for a while rather than having wars. Indeed, some of the characteristics of recent societies we can see, starting off in Western industrialized nations, will be pointed out in this article.

Everywhere we observe the same phenomena. Hierarchical organizations, no matter if private or governmental, are leaner, with responsibilities outsourced—even institutions like our universities now have to see how they get along by themselves, have to build networks instead of always expecting that something will come from top down. Everywhere networks are tied and for many companies it is a matter of survival to take into account a loss of control rather than doing without expert-networks, which are admittedly difficult to lead. Other networks like spontaneously organized protest movements, using modern communication technologies, give a feeling of freedom and hope to overcome traditional patterns. Whoever is interlinked sufficiently gets hold, though not for as guaranteed a long time as the permanent civil servant, because networks are at many times quickly changing; they are formed fast and also dissolved as quickly. In global networking our profit-driven economy is champion, followed by politics, NGOs, etc.;

even terrorists cannot be tracked down because their organization is web-like and less hierarchical. By avoiding authoritarian hierarchies for various reasons—because they are too ponderous, inhumane or easily targeted—someone (a person, a company, a state) is therefore preferably linked to several networks, getting out in time when parts of the network start crumbling or becoming poor. Networking has advantages as well as disadvantages.

Different from hierarchical patterns of decision making, networks are not as susceptible to corruption because you are at the helm and would inflict damage on yourself by doing so. But who decides which contributions (relinquishments) of the participants are necessary to prevent the network from becoming a self-service shop? So we see our present economical system in the paradoxical situation of having to decentralize power to survive on the market and at the same time being confronted with a self-destructive globalizing competition, driven by shareholder values. On the other hand networks can take up more complexity, and we experience a degree of social differentiation (the higher the social differentiation, the more spheres of living are determined, organized, regulated, especially what fits into the binary code) which has reached an extent that is unique in history. Any attempt to increase central control would seemingly have to take a simplification into account.

But we have to be aware that hierarchy itself up to now is the most successful network in history. And it is their success that forces hierarchies to surrender by creating responsibilities for every arising problem. The result is that authoritarian hierarchies become ponderous and ineffective. Chopping up what belongs together makes it difficult putting it back together in the afterward. Therefore decisions more and more have to be made decentralized and interdisciplinary in project-like landscapes, replacing inflexible ways of organization.

TWO WAYS OF ORGANIZING COMMUNICATION

The success of hierarchies in the history of the world originates in the application of the four Aristotelian axioms of logics on social systems. Communication in this context is accomplished in a way that a third, higher authority mediates between members of communication acts, like the law in the constitutional state. In short, those axioms say that the third in charge is a) identical with itself (everybody is defined through superiority and subordination, function is identical with the person), personifies b) the truth (regulates ambivalences e.g. in disposing good-evil norms), creates c) for every conflict generally applicable rules and has d) the power to execute central decisions, so that the hierarchy can function.[1] The compulsion into vertical communication reduces complexity and

makes cooperation possible, even between enemies. The system creates dependencies on authorities, which not only make "rational" decisions, but are also thought to be in charge of the psychological well being of the collective.[2] As thoroughly described in Lloyd deMause's works, leaders in hierarchies do so mainly by producing periodically demanded sacrifices, restaging childhood traumata on the stage of the society. These psychologically-caused repeating phases of purification strongly depend on the creation of inner and outer enemies. The hierarchical system seems to be a perfect playground to provide enemies, internally in the struggle for power, externally in fighting other hierarchical systems.

Always though you could even within hierarchies find another way of communicating, as with friends, colleagues and fellow-sufferers. Hierarchy unifies differences whereas in face-to-face communication they are given back their lives. We then speak of "informal communication" and hierarchies think of them as being subversive. Informal networks often consist of interlinked small groups (5 to 14 people) where everybody can be in direct communication with each other. The crucial jump always occurs when a larger quantity of persons should be linked together. When several groups want to communicate they have to do this with the help of representatives—this step is inevitable and automatically leads to a center. Organizations are therefore always and necessarily in some way structured hierarchically, there is no decentralization without centralization and there is no network without hierarchy. The difference is how we can develop at least a little trust towards people we do not know, and to our leaders, without only being able to love them, because they are punishing us. And trust is built in networks through cooperation, not through competition.

The building of trust requires inter-personal experiences—a two-way-communication. To trust somebody, for instance a politician, with whom I have no personal relationship is most likely one sided, based on plain sympathy or projection. Therefore the emotionally most intense networks can be found in small groups of adult individuals (not tied together through family relationships). The existence of a hierarchy has to be seen as a precondition for the building of such small groups (teams, projects, etc.), as only hierarchies free individuals of their family heritage identity. Of course these individuals carry with them their emotional state built in early childhood, but if the group reflects emotional issues, these emotions can be dealt with in an enlightened way.

WHEN NETWORKS TURN INTO HIERARCHIES

Small groups run into a quantity problem when they exceed the number of around 14 members. Then they loose their capacity of face-to-face-com-

munication. Emotional distance and de-motivation make larger group fall apart, their cohesion is not strong enough any more. Should there be further dependencies, communication has to be organized between groups via representatives. This automatically creates a hierarchy as the group of representatives decide for all members of the system without involving them all. Emotionally this makes hierarchies suspicious of misusing their power, we loose trust and empathy and we only have our fantasy left to give information what is being decided by whom and how. Trying to avoid hierarchy, for instance by not giving representatives the power they need, will lead to a state of not being able to make decisions. Networks as an alternative turn out to become more superficial as the number of members rise.

WHEN NETWORKS STAND SIDEWAYS TO HIERARCHIES

Networks opposing hierarchies within them are known as so called "informal systems." They build lobbies that influence decisions by undermining official meetings. Often rigid bureaucratic organizations are found to be unable to function without informal systems because tight regulations hinder flexibility needed to progress. Networks opposing hierarchies from the outside are often found to be movements as for instance Greenpeace, which points out what is not being considered by economical and political hierarchies. Everywhere we see anti-hierarchy movements, from critical circles to terrorist networks, attacking vulnerable spots of hierarchies.

WHEN NETWORKS COOPERATE WITH HIERARCHIES

To stay in realm when becoming a hierarchy leader, representatives often take advantage of networks. The present U.S. government, for instance, has tight connections with the Christian nationalist movements, both supporting each other in ways not always visible to the public. Michelle Goldberg has profoundly documented their relations in her book *Kingdom Coming*.[3] All hierarchy leaders more or less depend on ideological support from cooperating networks, which influence every decision being made. To gain insight in the interconnections between them is often reserved to a small number of people, what makes it difficult for all others to trust them.

PRINCIPALS OF MODERN SECULAR NETWORKS

Besides the steadily growing amount of studies about modern networks, they are currently put into practice, even if they sometimes do not work efficiently. Company structures turn into project-organizations, building hierarchy and predominating interdisciplinary, temporary groups, very often people working in several groups at the same time. In the private sector we see associations being created along almost every thinkable passion.

The European Union is an often-praised model for the networking between nations and said to be an export-model for the future also in other regions of the world. As to what I found in the literature and what can also be seen in our social laboratory experiments at the University of Klagenfurt,[4] networks are vulnerable to fall back into a more hierarchical structure and should therefore follow at least five principles:

1. *Networks unite under a shared idea and give identity.*[5] The organization of quantity becomes quality in this way. Common values—like the Human Rights—are imposed by the members of the network on themselves, are changeable and do not refer to a hereafter legitimation or expectation of salvation.
2. *Subsidiarity, any decision is delegated as far as possible to those directly affected.* Divergences of opinion are basically to resolve where they originate. The more compromises can be achieved, the higher the stability of the network, because more people are involved in decisions, which increase the acceptance of common decisions.
3. *Negotiation instead of prescription—a logical consequence of the principal of subsidiarity.* The burden of problems is being placed on many shoulders, central responsibilities act reserved and rather delegate competence. They help to create necessary structural conditions and take care that all involved members are equally heard, save results and support implementations.
4. *Poly-centralistic structures.*[6] All groups being part of the network (the community of shared values) are represented under the roof of the network, contribute and get concessions back—a constant giving and taking where acceptance and control is mutual.
5. *Leadership by reflection—the second enlightenment.*[7] The common doing and acting has to be reflected in regular periods under the microscope—a "Time Out" for joined thinking. Observations are being gathered, discussed, evaluated and turned into measures. The more people involved, the higher the degree of complexity will be, but more realistic picture of historical and social contexts can be created. The system is endangered to backlash into hierarchy-immanent patterns of reflection-taboo when reflection is spared out. Networks are more process oriented and gain orientation and identity via reflection.

EMOTIONALITY AND ORGANIZATION

As a system of indirect, anonymous communication,[8] organization always attracts mistrust. It is therefore suitable for the production of fantasies and myths as projection objects for restaging alters.[9] Even their structural social architecture is often chosen unconsciously along their fields of emotional tensions of their products[10] and it is not by accident that people with specific emotional dispositions work in specific organizations—like universi-

ty people.[11] A psychoanalysis of the individual today is not possible without understanding modern human beings as organizational beings,[12] as hardly any areas of life left over which are not directly or indirectly affected by social differentiation.

Because we cannot "like" or "love" organizations—anonymous communication makes us suspicious, we are kept in dependencies from delegates who might betray us. The conflict of representatives is a structurally given fact, them having to represent the interests of their group (bottom up) as well as the interests of the group of representatives (top down). Therefore the emotional pictures we have for them are mostly hostile, driven by fantasies of what might be going on behind our backs and projecting these fears on their representatives. When leaders are confronted with such fantasies, they tend to get the feeling of losing control and start taking more rigid measures. The group-fantasy cycles of leadership as described by Lloyd deMause[13] can be found in all systems of anonymous communication, from small companies up to nations. In the "organization laboratory" experiments at the University of Klagenfurt we sometimes ask students to draw pictures of their feelings about the current situation at several times during the process. They not only show the same phases but tend to show more violence as the groups feel that they will loose power when they have to pass it on to representatives who then are in the position to decide for all. The more systems become centralistic, the more other groups are seen as enemies and the representatives as having lost touch with the "real world." Linking together groups forces them to partially give away self-control and the farther away from the centre one is, the less the feeling of being represented. Usually the positive identification with the systems ends when a "government" is being formed and the central question is how the motivational connection between the power and the basis can be regained. The best answer I saw was developed in one experiment several years ago: the representatives only decided problems of little importance by voting; solving crucial questions was delegated to mixed expert groups which were empowered to make decisions all will have to follow. Once problems are solved and decisions made, they lose their power again and go back to their groups. The quick problem-oriented change of authority, a rotation of power but with stabile centers (the groups and the almost powerless group of representatives) creates at least some trust towards other groups and the hierarchy, and this is exactly what controlled networking does.

Among the participants we were able to observe an increasing organizational consciousness and skill of the laboratories over the years. Have there sometimes only been two options, either not interlinking groups at

all because of the fear of loss of self-control or the wish for a strong government that regulates everything. We now see a greater variety in handling the inevitable contradiction of indirect communication together with an increased confidence in not known others. A shift in the personality structures of the participants from "we want to have it cosy in our groups and a authority not bothering us should take care that it stays this way" to "we do not want to be caught in steady groups anymore, we like shifting circumstances even when it's a bit disorderly and do not fear power" seems to have taken place.

Fritz Riemann, founder of The Academy of Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy has found "Four Basic Forms of Fear"[14] resulting from the shaping in early childhood that determine the personality of the adult. His findings—set into relation with psychohistory—reveal the shift of personality structures that make it nowadays possible to overcome the need for scapegoating and sacrifices:[15]

Modality A "Freedom" DISTANCE	**Modality B** "Emotionality" PROXIMITY	**Modality C** "Orderliness" PERMANENCE	**Modality D** "Daring" CHANGE
1. Relationships			
restricted, alone, hides in a crowd, anonymous	symbiotic, fusion, pair relationship	clearly defined, hierarchical, organized relationships	changing relationships, never permanent
2. Skills			
analyst, critical insight, incorruptible	altruistic, good atmosphere is essential	exact, systematic, methodical, fair, concentrated	creative, full of fantasy, enthusiastic
3. Difficult because			
unapproachable, cold, distrustful, pessimistic	dependent on sympathy, "hanger-on"	inflexible, ultra-conservative, persistent	unreliable, unavailable, narcissistic
4. Afraid of			
too close a proximity, commitments *Psychopathological label:* schizoid	distance, being alone *Psychopathological label:* depression	chaos, unreliability *Psychopathological label:* compulsion	restrictions, responsibility *Psychopathological label:* hysteria
5. form of aggression			
cynicism, arrogance, derogatory of others	evokes guilty feelings, emotional blackmail	beaureaucratic chicanery, obstinacy	drama, makes scenes

Relating the modalities of personality with each other we can see some interesting aspects, which might be important for the emotional precondition for the building of networks:



Compared, the modalities C and D show a tension between the fear of chaos and the fear of restriction, whereas the modalities A and B create a tension between the fear of closeness and the fear of distance. Divided horizontally shows the modalities A and C as rather cognitive qualities and B and D as more emotional. Divided vertically we see the pair C and B as conservative modalities and A and D as more innovative factors. Now what does this have to do with the relationship between hierarchies and networks?

Hierarchies regard themselves as systems of duration (they want to live forever) and create, inherent as a system, defenses against change. They prefer clear circumstances of superiority and subjugation (deductive) and therefore see the qualities of C as their most important one and relationships should be long lasting and stable (modality B). Networks on the other hand strongly favor creativity and change and therefore require A (new inventions) and D (crossing of boundaries). Can we suppose that a shift in personality patterns has taken place, so networks are equipped with the right people who are not afraid of change and new inventions?

I do not know about any quantitative mega-study investigating the patterns of personalities and their change. Psychohistory concludes from the

evolution of childrearing modes that social changes are taking place. Out of my and my fellow group dynamic people's work, one little evidence for presently changing personality structures can be described from the results of a questionnaire developed by Peter Heintel[16] along the four patterns described by Fritz Riemann. Starting to apply the test in conflict management seminars about 20 years ago, about 3500 people have filled it out until today. Unfortunately no one has yet done a systematic evaluation of the results, but clearly the following can be stated:

1. Personality structures always show a more or less clear dominant modality and a second subdominant one, mostly from the opposing tension pair, e.g. dominant C, subdominant A.
2. Over the years a slow shifting, depending on the age, gender and work field of the persons can be observed: when in former years the dominant modality almost always showed C in front, we now more often see the phenomenon that D values are gaining at the expense of C, and at the other tension pair, A seems to surprisingly be losing at the expense of B.

	A	B	C	D
1980-1994	98	94	111	102
1994-2004	91	99	109	104
Δ	-7	+5	-2	+2[17]

The above figures show an increase of the emotional modalities B, D what leads to the conclusion that people invest less in intellectual performances and value less orderliness and compulsion. And: as mode A has its origins in the first weeks after birth when the sense for basic trust is built, the dramatic decline can be seen as an increased capability to develop trust under insecure circumstances.

This at least underlines the assumption that at least in the German-speaking countries, where the test has mostly been applied, a collective change of personality structures is going on, leading to a conflict between hierarchical preferences for order and network-like readiness to take risks. In many fields of European societies we indeed observe today a struggle between central responsibility and determination (deduction) and decentralized increase of power and differentiation (induction).

THE EMOTIONALITY OF NETWORKS

The greater openness and social responsiveness of networks, internally (no forced membership) as well as externally (open for new members) requires the try to avoid the creation of discrimination and concepts of enemies

at least on members of the network. That does not mean everybody loves each other now. Shifting and often transparent power creates permanent mistrust and jealousy, especially "against parts of the network farther away."[18] Other phenomena are a decrease of exclusive belongings to groups, whole groups of people behave flexible, one is open for changing circumstances towards equals as well as towards leaders, who for the first time can be trusted a little bit, even when they do not act as sacrificing priests. One spends time in several groups—sometimes parallel—and cannot be responsive to lasting relationships, even when you sometimes have the desire to it. The wish turns into illusion, as for example in nostalgic pictures: you feel very close to persons (or groups) even if you have had nothing to do with them for a long time. The quickly changing relationships often lead to feelings of disappointment and the insecurity of whom to trust. The knowledge of your own possibility of being replaced nurtures the fear of losing membership (belonging to somewhere), falling out of the network without having a safety net. Practically networks then sometimes give the impression of self-service supermarkets, where everybody tries to pull out as much as possible while being part of it. There are plenty of examples for what happens when networks start becoming being full of holes, because something appears useless. For instance the migration from the Alps as people move to the cities or increased unemployment as we run out of (paid for) work, or the disappearing of scientific disciplines because no one pays for what does not produce a return on investment. Indeed the fear of being dropped legitimates the defense of ones own power-position and the steady suspicion that others are using unfair methods because they fear the same. The fear of success, as Lloyd deMause describes it, creates a pendulum between centralization and decentralization in networks that have to be kept in motion.

The flexibilities of networks are originated in the decentralization of power and decision-making. In poly-centralistic systems though, power is felt to be transparent and that is why permanent hidden practicing of power and cheating is being suspected. Having its advantage being "like a chameleon that permanently re-invents itself,"[19] networks create their counterpart in the feeling of insecurity because of increased in-transparency (the "invisible hand" of the economy, the invisible terrorists). Proactive modern networks do not seem to need a god who has to stay invisible so one can believe in "Her," the invisible has seemingly become humane presently.[22] Fast and transparent change though creates the feeling of a lack of orientation, which is considered as one source for another characteristic of modern networks.

ACCELERATION OF TIME

In my own empirical studies I have found out that a lack of orientation almost always leads to an increase of speed of acting, alternating with phases of apparent paralysis. The function of mania thereby consists in suggesting being in control of an unbearable situation[21] or as the ancient Greek put it, when Pan stands up and shows his ugly underneath—our fears—you have no choice but to take the bull by the horn. Manic phases usually end in an act of sacrifice,[22] but the cycle of guilt (for too much progress) and purification (through war or cutting of social spending) seems to have broken in the post-WWII Europe, keeping us in a permanent state of mania. Time as a resource has been set free and we experience an unique acceleration in history that effects all spheres of life. The economy makes "Speed Management"[23] a constraint that does not leave anybody untouched who wants to be part of the network EU. Philosophers speak of the concept of "Gegenwartsschrumpfung" (the shrinkage of the present),[24] Peter Heintel has even founded an Association for the Deceleration of Time[25] and demands a collective effort for "Innehalten" (stop for a moment) as the acceleration is producing self-inflicting damage to the economy and other parts of society. Some even say we have entered an era of timelessness[26] that countermands established patterns of time and what we can observe seems to underline this thesis: while one part of the population feels like "a hamster in the wheel" we see on the other side people that fight for the maintenance of their dignity, left behind with the feeling of not being useful anymore, unable to keep the pace.

What is a desired result in the technical world—a clear and fast impulse—reflex expectation—reaches a limit where acceleration is only made possible for a high price. Every day we witness ecological and physical consequences of an accelerated agriculture like BSE, SARS or the present Bird Flu, producing fast spreading panics to be forgotten as quickly without eliminating the homemade causes, like the mass keeping of animals. Our ways of living together change as well. Especially in the metropolises, the most important knots of the network, the percentage of single households rises steadily, not only because modern partnerships demand the right for equal individuality, but also because there is sometimes simply not enough time spent which is needed to keep a relation going. If you are in danger of losing your job, every absence from the network represents the risk of dropping out.

Previously I described that leadership in networks requires times for collective reflection to give orientation. Unfortunately this is very rarely seen in practice, often argued, because there is not enough time left for think-

ing things over, but actually to avoid conflicts of different interests. Process oriented development means joined efforts to overcome the hierarchical split of responsibilities and this can only be achieved through organized periods of reflection—especially in an extensively interlinked society which shows signs of wanting to remain in a permanent "state of restricted panic." It will be the challenge of the future to integrate time of acceleration and "Eigenzeit" (an artificial word, meaning "what has its own time", like all processes in nature and forms of social systems), but also to handle time gaps due to different developments of societies.

Finally the question is, if networks are "young, fast and female," what will happen to Old, Slow and Male?

Should this species that has adorned the senates of our hierarchies for over 20,000 years be now obsolete, not needed any more? Did the male priests of societies have to resign and a new, more female and network-like structure is about to develop, where hierarchical affected behavior is out of place because no one believes in any more? Do networks need something like sidings for extinguished psychoclasses? Taking a walk in the streets of London today one might think this is already a dying species, but the demographic figures in the EU show a different picture: our societies are aging and politics is desperately trying to find ways to finance a pension system, for instance by increasing the retirement age whereas at the same time companies try to get rid of employees that are over 45 years of age because they are expensive and their qualifications are not needed any more. Of course what we experience now cannot substitute our hierarchies but create a counterpart to help to resolve urgent social questions like securing the older population, and invest in the right childrearing even when the mothers want to play a stronger public role. In this respect the EU has an advantage compared to the U.S., say Mark Leonard and Jeremy Rifkin,[27] because the successors of the European protestant tradition have kept social institutions upright, together with a growing Civil Society this creates a social security net that helps to prevent greater polarizations, according the maxim: at least it is a progress to exploit each other rather than only being exploited.

A NEW JUSTICE

To keep a society in balance Aristotle recommends distinguishing between three types of justice:

1. Justice of Performance: who performs more has the right to get more;
2. Justice of Needs: who needs more (as children) has the right to get more;
3. Justice of Law: balances the contradiction of performance and need.

The model of mediating between conflicting positions can be seen in a hierarchical way by determining the relationship between need and performance. Due to the lack of being able to handle complex problems, the "regulator" loses its legitimation and the responsibility falls back to the proponents, sometimes without official permission to decide. On the other hand important issues like the raising and education of children will not be able to improve unless there is a central responsibility. It seems to be a vicious circle: the more we have to handle ourselves in network activities, the more we seem to depend on central reminders of the direction we are going. There is one Joker in the game: What Jeremy Rifkin says about the Civil Society,[28] the "Invisible Hand" of emotional and social progress that supports networks in all fields between the markets and governments might remind on Hegel's "Trick of Reason (List der Vernunft)", a last resort in overcoming dilemma. Their success depends on their capability to fill the vacuum hierarchical institutions and markets have produced. Aristotle did not think of a Civil Society that creates all kinds of social groups where people have the feeling to belong to each other. In addition to his three justices we might have to think of a fourth justice, a "Civil Justice," that can do without being regulated by a law, because existing rules are accepted anyway, but are not sufficient enough to be a social trustee of a bunch of tasks in education, health, arts, etc. To build trust between people strongly relies on the progress of childrearing, bringing up a new psychoclass (helping mode) that does not feel the need to fight anybody to keep mentally sane. During his stay in Austria and Germany in the fall of 2005, Lloyd deMause said in one of his speeches that the real wonder in post-war Europe was not the economic wonder but the change in childrearing since 1950 that brought Europe, especially the two-mentioned countries, ahead of America and the U.K. Revolting against authoritarian habits of the past that led to WWII, the student protests in the late 1960s have to be pointed out as the revolution of peace, rejecting authoritarian families and the routine humiliation and abuse of children as well as adults both in our homes and institutions. This opened the way for building the trust necessary to empower networks. It was only a matter of short time to invent computers and advanced communication technologies, making them available to civilians and not only for the U.S. army.

To create and maintain networks though is work, needs resources and time of the members of the network. Who cannot be provided with these is outside the net and cannot participate. We can be proud of our economy that is able to increase productivity so eliminating human labor in huge extent can be made real. The Protestant dogma that you only deserve to have a living in the sweat of one's brow is not needed anymore but pre-

vents accepting new ways of living together. If a Civil Society that takes care of needs and innovation of its members should have a perceptible effect, networking cannot only be a privilege of economics. We know that unemployment has a devastating effect on the sense of self-esteem, falling out of the (mostly hierarchical) network of the employer. Are the unemployed and poorly integrated members of our society the new sacrifices of our permanent manic acting, a negative residue of former Protestant values? Starting out from social sciences the idea of paying every citizen a "basic income," no matter if he/she works or not, from birth on, is today discussed even among politicians Europe-wide. The costs would not exceed what is now paid for social security reasons but would—together with creating prevailing conditions for civil networks—foster integration as well as innovation and reform. Maybe we soon will see politics that frees itself from being dependent on the economy, more transparency of financial markets (and all powerful networks), regulation of global competition of markets, a Marshall Plan for the Third World, more social experiments and building of models for a future society.[29]

This article was given as the Distinguished Academic Lecture at the 29th Annual Convention of the International Psychohistorical Association in New York City on June 9, 2006.

ENDNOTES

1. Gerhard Schwarz, "Die heilige Ordnung der Männer," Westdeutscher Verlag 1985, S. 202 ff.
2. Aristotle described in his "Nikomachic Ethics" all virtues a leader should have to be a good example for the population.
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